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I.       Introduction 
 
The Medi-terranean is situated in the “middle of the lands”: the cradle of past civilizations, trade 
– and wars. The end of the Cold War shifted the security dilemma from “East and West” to new 
centers, many “related to the rise of ethnically based conflicts in portions of former Communist 
Europe” (Ibryamova and Kanet 2002, 100), with the potential to spill over and/or connect with 
others to the south and east in the Mediterranean (“Med”).  The “fluidity” in the Mediterranean is 
reflected today in a certain lack of stability, whether e.g. in the Palestine/Israeli conflict, 
uncontrolled immigration from North Africa into the EU, illegal drug and arms trafficking, or the 
build up of arms (especially WMDs) per se in the region in general and terrorism in particular. In 
addition to the instability and insecurity these issues cause to the entire Mediterranean region, 
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  3they also “cause punishing economic losses to states that struggle to play within the rules” 
(Nachmani 1999, 95). 
        The population of the EU today is approximating 450 million, that of the countries bordering 
the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean 350 million, with the number of people 
under fifteen years of age in this latter region reaching thirty percent of the total population by 
2025 (Nachmani 1999, 95). Yet despite the similarity in population, the diversity in terms of 
religion, history, the wide income gap between the northern and southern Mediterranean, and 
strong population growth in the south- and eastern Mediterranean, to name a few, are adding risk 
factors
1 to continued regional instability. 
           An  area  with  such  a  relatively  high  population  density  and  historical  socio-political 
instability is naturally of security interest to its neighbors, not only to the north of the 
Mediterranean, but also south-east, such as Iran and Iraq and the Gulf region. While NATO 
solved the self-help game of Europe’s security dilemma which had governed Europe up to World 
War II, the post-Cold War paradigm of the “major power consensus model” (E. Haas 1964) of the 
U.S. vis-a-vis European collective security had changed. The regional Mediterranean security 
debate centered on the question of whether it was now a European (Weaver 2000) or a NATO 
responsibility (Brevin 2004, 9). NATO (“the Alliance”) recognized that security and stability in 
the Mediterranean is a significant factor in Europe’s security structures (NATO Handbook 2002, 
Ch. 3). “Both the gulf War and the conflicts in former Yugoslavia helped to solidify the view that 
the existing Western security community and its institutions should be expanded to incorporate 
other parts of the continent” (Ibryamova and Kanet 2002, 100). Parallel to this re-evaluation of 
post-Cold War European security, other security debates took place, e.g. during the Maastricht 
Treaty negotiations West European governments agreed to full membership of the West European 
Union for Greece only if its Article V would be rewritten so that they would not be obliged to 
support Greece in war against Turkey (Brevin 2004, 10)
2.  
        Overall,  Brevin  (2004,  12)  argues  that the EU is likely to take on a greater sense of 
responsibility for peace in the (Eastern) Mediterranean in the future. In his analysis he argues that 
it is essential to understand the differing interests of parties in conflict – although the protection 
of heterogeneous European interests would not be the main criterion. Rather, Brevin states that 
according to social contract theory, the parties are in a social relationship (rather than a power 
political relationship based on fear of the power of the other parties) (Ibid.). This would mean that 
the first priority of such a social relationship is the respect of the political liberty of the parties 
involved in the conflict, and the second priority to promote the economic interests of the least 
advantaged (be they Israeli citizens threatened by a nuclear bomb, or Palestinians losing their 
olive groves). While the EU as a sui generis structure of “blended” inter-governmentalism and 
supranationalism (with the “fate” of its foreign policy dependent on the passing of a constitutional 
treaty) had left its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) somewhat “under-
institutionalized, ad hoc and uneven in its development” (Brevin 2004, 13), the EU’s overall 
involvement in the southern and eastern Mediterranean indicates its priority in addressing the 
diverse socio-political and economic needs there by founding a strategic partnership, the 
“EuroMed Partnership” (“EMP”) (also known as the “Barcelona Process”) in November 1995 
with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, following the end of the Cold War and its resulting 
de-stabilizations in Central and Eastern Europe.  
         In comparison, NATO’s mandate shifted post-Cold War from defending a clearly delimited 
territory to a new strategy of committing member states to defend  
                                                           
    
1 This paper focuses on Mediterranean security from a “regional” perspective. Hence specific issues such as Turkey, 
Cyprus, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, Russia’s role in the Partnership for Peace, the Adriatic portion of the Balkans or 
Bosnia Herzegovina per se as a de facto UN state-protectorate in the Adriatic corner of the Mediterranean region will 
not be discussed at length. 
2 Peace with its neighbors also being a requirement of an EU applicant state, such as Turkey. 
  4      unbounded interests beyond Europe’s theater of operations: NATO’s new mandate 
is as global as the Western interests it has pledged to defend … [implying] that the Arab 
world will received its fair share of NATO attention … [such as] crisis operations … to 
keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises (which could affect Euro-
Atlantic stability) at an early stage (El-Gawhary 1999, 16/7). 
 
        In this paper I will compare and contrast how the multilateral efforts in terms of NATO’s 
Mediterranean Dialogue (“Dialogue”) program, involving i.a. U.S. interests in the Mediterranean, 
and the European Union’s (“EU”) EuroMed Partnership as the EU’s European Neighborhood 
Policy’s main approach to its Mediterranean neighbors
3 have affected Mediterranean security 
post-Cold War. This study takes place at the system level of analysis, exploring both bilateral and 
regional issues and interactions, including those of institutional and non-governmental actors 
(NGOs) (Neak 2003, 12). 
        This paper takes a constructivist approach and, although acknowledging aspects of realism 
inherent in it such as rational actors
4, by contrasting the hard power and soft power approaches in 
the institutional analysis (in order to understand the history, culture and institutional dynamics 
post-Cold War) of the EMP and the Dialogue. Klotz and Lynch (2007, 3) write: 
     The  end  of  the  Cold  War  shattered stable antagonisms and alliances… This 
destabilization widened the political and intellectual spaces - and increased the need – 
for scholars to ask questions about the cultural bases of conflict, alternative conceptions 
of national identity, [and] the ethics of intervention… Individuals and groups are not 
only shaped by their world but can also change it. People can … set into motion new 
normative, cultural, economic, social, or political practices that alter conventional 
wisdoms and standard operating procedures. 
 
Constructivism stresses “structural continuities and processes of change” (Ibid.) based on agency, 
which is shaped by its social, spatial and historical context (Ibid.). However, constructivism does 
not give ontological priority to either structure or agency, but views them as mutually constituted, 
rejecting “the individualism inherent in rationalist theories of choice, which take for granted the 
nature of actors’ interests and identities” (Ibid.). Instead constructivism takes seriously “the 
principle that social reality is produced through meaningful action” (Ibid., 4). It is the “norms, 
rules, meanings, languages, cultures, and ideologies [as] … social phenomena that create 
identities and guide actions” (Ibid., 7). 
          My  methodology  will  identify  the  co-constitution  between  the  actors  and  institutional 
structures in a less rigid notion between positivist and post-positivist “data”, and the effect actors’ 
interests and identities have on socio-political processes in the Euro-Mediterranean post-Cold 
War. I argue that co-constitution between both types of powers are necessary and interrelated in 
contributing to the Mediterranean regional security complex, rather than having a simple causal 
relationship.  
        The sources for this analysis are primary (e.g. EU and NATO websites and documents) and 
secondary data (news articles and scholarly books published on the subject). 
 
II.  Comparison of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue with the EuroMed Partnership  
 
NATO changed post-Cold War from that of a collective defense organization to a collective 
security organization. It seeks to avoid new polarizations and the creation of new dividing lines 
between formers friends and foes as well as to seek cooperation between former adversaries 
                                                           
    
3 referred to here interchangeably as “MENA” or “southern and eastern Mediterranean neighbors” of the EU 
    
4 and in this paper in particular, by definition, the association of NATO with “war”/Article V missions 
  5through integration in Allied progress, e.g. Partnership for Peace (PfP) and special relationships 
as mechanisms for exporting stability to new member countries.  
        The  EMP’s  goals  are  similar,  supporting socio-political cohesion i.a. through regional 
integration, socialization for the enhancement of civil society and commercial norms, the rule of 
law, institutionalization, and economic and political integration after the disintegrations occurring 
in parts of the greater Mediterranean (such as the former Yugoslavia). This complementarity 
between the EU and NATO post-Cold War is also expressed during the formulation of the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
5, in former Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albrights’s often quoted words of “no de-coupling, no duplication and no diminuation” from 
NATO. While the ESDP focuses more on peacekeeping
6, NATO continues to solve the European 
security dilemma by providing legitimacy to intervention, not so much militarily but as a political 
forum for the debate of legitimacy, including out-of-area missions now. The conflicts from the 
dissolving Yugoslavia showed e.g. that a security threat to Europe could arise not so much 
through direct aggression but from the adverse consequences of instabilities in countries 
neighboring the EU. Hence, while both the Dialogue and the EMP are intergovernmental 
organizations with multilateral missions, the next section will outline the complementarity of both 
hard and soft power in constructing the Mediterranean security complex. 
 
A.  Who are the Actors and What are the Structures?  
     
1.  NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative 
 
NATO has been implementing the Partnership for Peace (“PfP”) project since January 1994, 
including twenty-seven partner countries from Europe, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central 
Asia. NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative was formally launched in December 1994 as the 
“Mediterranean Dialogue” (“Dialogue”), reflecting the alliance’s recognition of the 
Mediterranean’s unique regional security challenges. The Dialogue was also intended to reach out 
to non-NATO member countries who might be interested in collaborating with NATO’s 
Mediterranean security and stability projects. These “partners” would not be allies at the 
beginning but would be involved in confidence building programs, to become members when 
some major qualifications were met, e.g. irreversible commitments to democracy, civilian control 
of the military and development of a nation’s military capability to a level of interoperability with 
those of NATO members” (Kaplan 1999, 195). The Dialogue’s aims initially were to increase 
mutual understanding between, and dispel misperceptions among, NATO and its Mediterranean 
Partners through a phased approach (Cooperation between ICI Countries & NATO, 4/29/2007,1). 
Non-discrimination and self-differentiation have been key principles of the Dialogue since its 
inception, and allow bilateral as well as multilateral consultations between NATO and its 
Mediterranean members. Members were free to choose the extent and intensity of their 
participation in Dialogue programs, such as seminars and workshops in the field of information, 
science and the environment, crisis management and military cooperation, as well as optional 
participation in NATO School courses in Oberammergau/Germany and at the NATO Defense 
College in Rome/Italy (Monacco 2004, 1). 
         The Mediterranean Dialogue, as a sub-program of the PfP specifically seeks to improve the 
understanding of Mediterranean security perceptions and concerns of its partners, e.g. enabling 
low level military cooperation, such as emergency planning, peacekeeping and peace supporting 
(Said 2004). This Dialogue started initially with five countries (Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Israel 
and Egypt), with Algeria and Mauritania joining later. Subsequently, it also involved talks with 
                                                           
    
5 as the “formalization” of the EU’s CFSP 
    
6 Favoring non-military approaches to security, although not excluding the willingness to use military force and 
capabilities if necessary for self-defense 
  6the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE). 
Initially, this initiative was limited to “dialogue”, as NATO had other pressing priorities, such as 
enlargement and developing the post-Cold War relationship with Russia. New members of the 
dialogue were weary of NATO’s image as a Cold War institution and preferred to concentrate on 
“soft” security and economic issues to develop mutual confidence and trust, rather than “hard” 
security issues of defense and military cooperation. In the first dozen years post-Cold War, 
NATO was much more actively engaged in Eastern Europe and as a result of the hesitations by its 
Mediterranean partners only sporadically engaged there (Nachmani 1999, 97).         
         Post-9/11 both the American and European members have been advocating an expansion of 
the Dialogue. The U.S.-led Afghan and Iraq campaigns also let to a greater involvement of the 
Alliance on the international stage. In particular the wider Mediterranean region and the Greater 
Middle East have gained new relevance to NATO in the last few years (Said 2004). At their June 
2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO leaders offered to elevate the Dialogue to a genuine partnership 
and increase its objectives from public diplomacy, civil emergency planning, defense policy and 
strategy discussions, small arms and light weapons, global humanitarian mine action, initiatives 
on WMD proliferation and military cooperation, to one of enhanced security and regional 
stability operations, especially terrorism prevention (Cooperation between ICI Countries & 
NATO, 4/29/2007, 1) 2/3). It is interesting to note that, while NATO supports the Quartet and UN 
efforts in resolving the Middle East conflict, NATO was not invited to intervene in it (Ibid., 3), 
confirming the post-Cold War structured shift of NATO from that of collective defense 
organization to that of collective security organization. 
        The  debate  concerning  the  future  of the Dialogue now consists of moving it to one of 
concrete Partnership with the development of a common view among Mediterranean member 
countries in terms of general strategic expectations for a future Partnership, especially terrorism 
and border control, and a willingness to take advantage of existing instruments in the context of 
the need for the U.S. to formulate a coherent policy on the greater Middle East (Monacco 2004, 
2). 
 
2.  The EuroMed Partnership: Identity and Interests  
 
Following the destabilization in the regions surrounding the EU, EU foreign policy focused on 
developing a of stable, friendly and prosperous neighbors zone surrounding it (Eurobarometer 
2006). Per this EU Neighborhood Policy (“ENP”), countries neighboring the EU would be 
offered “a framework for the development of a new and mutually beneficial relationship with 
countries that do not aspire to EU- membership in the medium terms … [through] the prospect of 
a stake in the Union’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the 
free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital” (the so-called four freedoms) (European 
Commission website “wider Europe – Neighborhood”, quoted in: Thiele et al. 2005, 83). 
         The EMP constitutes the EU’s main multilateral foreign policy instrument in MENA. The 
first Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Barcelona in November 
1995 and marked the official starting point of the EuroMed Partnership (also known as the 
“Barcelona Process”). The “three pillars” of the EMP (reflecting in fact some of the goals set out 
in President Bush’s and President Gorbachev’s invitation to the Peace Conference of 1991) 
consist of the following in greater detail and follow the dual regional (multilateral) and bilateral 
tracks established in the Madrid Peace Conference for the international relations among EMP 
members:  
•  the definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of the 
political and security dialogue; 
•  the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial 
partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area; 
  7•  and the rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership 
aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil 
society” (Horizon 2020 Bulletin 2005, 2). 
 
         Currently, the EMP comprises the twenty-seven EU-memberstates, and ten Mediterranean 
Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia 
and Turkey, which is also an EU candidate country) and Libya as observer since 1999). Malta and 
Cyprus, also original EuroMed Partners, are now EU member states. The EMP’s mandate is 
based on the political, economic and culturally strategic significance of the Mediterranean region 
to the European Union (EU) and seeks to develop a relationship between its partners based on 
“comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links 
forged by neighbourhood and history” (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona declaration).    
        The EMP is hence an example of Putnam’s two-level game, whereby the foreign policies of 
its members are played out multilaterally in the Mediterranean region. Its programs also affect 
individual member states domestically through their emphasis on education, civil society 
building, democracy enhancing and human rights promotion. Since the socio-cultural aspect of 
the EMP also involves NGOs in cultural and educational programs, the effect of transnational 
actors reflects linkages of interests and actions across national lines.   
              MENA member states often view the EMP “as a series of ‘irreversible’ and ‘strategic’ 
choices that are seen as prerequisites for the necessary liberalization of …[some] econom[ies]” 
(Thiele et al. 2005, 65), and is favored on occasion  because it is not predominated by a 
hegemon
7, such as the U.S. Nevertheless, many MENA EMP members do consider soft security 
and developmental policies as insufficient to deal with international threats and are very 
interested in assistance to carry out policing and security tasks effectively, such as having 
technical equipment and training made available to them more readily through the Dialogue 
(Ibid., 66). 
 
 B.   Comparison of Interests, Identities, and Structures 
 
The EMP’s unique value is its normative dimension based on the EU’s emphasis on democracy, 
adherence to human rights, the fight against international terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs 
and regional conflicts. Some of these issue areas are pursued by the EMP in terms of 
development of civil society, while others peruse EU and international, NGO or policy 
organizations. The economic “engine” to drive this regional integration is the goal for a EuroMed 
free trade area by 2010, and the harmonization of legal structures and judicial systems to support 
this. Between 2004 and 2006 the EU provided five billion Euros in grants (Symons 2004) to 
MENA, and one billion Euros per year for EMP-projects specifically from 2006 onward (Howells 
2005). 
        While the EU is supportive of bringing peace and security to the regions surrounding it, i.a. 
to accelerate modernization and reform through institutional development supportive of 
democracy, human rights and human development, it can only achieve the goals, if members on 
the eastern and southern border of the Med are willing to achieve them. In light of the fact that a 
large portion of the population in the region is under 25 years of age, economic growth is not 
keeping pace (Howells 2005, 2) and the EMP needs to re-invigorate itself to increase trade within 
the region through the liberalization of agriculture and services, as well as its member countries to 
determine paths to political reforms, and to commit to halving illiteracy by 2010, to ensure 
equality of access to quality education for boys and girls by 2015 and ensure that by 2015 all 
children complete at least primary education (Ibid.) in MENA. 
                                                           
    
7 i.e. in keeping the term “hegemon” in a state-context. In “neo-“ or “post- Westphalian” terms the EU itself could of 
course be seen hegemonically. 
  8        As  much  as  the  EU  is  about  soft power to support development as security, NATO’s 
activities include besides the new non-Article V activities post Cold-War also still “Article V”: 
within a day of September 11, NATO members invoked for the first time in their history Article 
V of the Atlantic Treaty, demonstrating not only European support for the War on Terror, but also 
its willingness to undertake out-of-area missions in support of Alliance-wide security in order to 
help defeat terrorism in Afghanistan. Without the U.S. partnership in the Dialogue (and the 
Alliance overall), Europeans would lack military capability in the security complex which is the 
EU and its neighborhood (continuing post-Cold War since the ESDP, as discussed above, was not 
meant to duplicate NATO capabilities), but compensate with their ability to pick up the bill for 
post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, for example. 
 
III.   Multilateralism in the Mediterranean security discourse 
 
Membership in the EMP is not identical to member countries of the Dialogue (i.e. Mauritania as a 
Dialogue member is not even a Mediterranean country, for example). The EU, via the EMP and 
vis-à-vis NATO in the Mediterranean, have been institutionally broadly described above. The 
diversity of interests and political orientations of the Mediterranean partner countries to the EMP 
and the Dialogue reflect their differing economic and internal social development problems, and 
their interests, identities and structures overall. What then is the future of these two organizations 
in the Mediterranean? Some observers have pointed to a possible competition in the 
Mediterranean between the EMP, NATO, as well as other organizations, e.g. the OSCE’s 
Mediterranean Initiative, and possible redundancy. Chris Patton (2004) acknowledged in a speech 
a couple of years ago that on the one hand the EU needs to take more responsibility in relations 
with Islamic countries from Morocco to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, “depressingly, witlessly, we 
have to a great extent shaped our disaster-in-waiting” (Ibid.). He distanced himself from the U.S. 
to the point of stressing that Arabs need to have control of their agenda, presumably so that the 
conditionality of European aid, which he favors, would be agreed to by Arab negotiators (quoted 
in Brewin 2004, 18). Although Patton admitted that “in the dreadful situation in Iraq…America 
and Europe have to work together to try to end the whole affair in tolerable order”. (Ibid., 19). 
        What then are some of the options the EU and the U.S. have available to not only administer 
peace in the Mediterranean post-Iraq, but also to contribute to those socio-economic and political 
developments supportive of political regional stability? The studies cited point to similar 
conclusions about support for peace, security and sustained development through an 
intensification of the Dialogue and, parallel to this, more hard power option.  
       In contrast, the EMP’s soft power approach encourages good governance, education, human 
rights and democracy. Thiele et al. (2005, 88) suggest as a policy option a strategic partnership 
through an enhanced EU-NATO Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean would maximize 
rather than duplicate institutional cooperation, especially in crisis management projects, and   
involve pragmatic burden sharing. This type of collaboration would permit the U.S. a continued 
presence in the Mediterranean post-Iraq through a multi-lateral approach towards common issues 
and interests, and hereby balance the extra “interest bestowed upon” the Eastern Mediterranean in 
contrast to the Western Mediterranean by NATO partner programs. This dual approach could be 
considered useful in dealing with issues of in-security spill-over from Iraq in the intermediate 
future by having all member states trained and prepared in conflict prevention, crisis management 
and sub-regional security regimes, and hopefully be able to make progress in the development of 
democracy and upholding of human rights in this region (Thiele et al. 91). 
 
A. Constructivism and Security Cooperation NATO – ESDP 
 
Traditional neorealist theory holds that the preconditions of the international system enable states 
to take certain foreign policy actions but not others (Waltz 1979). Waltz (1959) also suggested 
  9that to understand state action in terms of war (as a foreign policy behavior), one needs to 
understand the dynamics of the international system as well as its internal characteristics, such as 
leadership, as they may explain the immediate reasons why a war is undertaken. However, the 
multilateralism described in the previous sections does not call to mind the realist realm of 
international relations, one characterized by a constant struggle to maintain sovereignty from 
other states in anarchy. Rather, I propose here that the “international system” of the 
Mediterranean region and the institutional structures of the Dialogue and the EMP are neither a 
“finite” system of a zero-sum game, nor (due to the supra-national aspects of the EU at least), are 
the dynamics of the “Med” exclusively state-centric, with states as the only actors of note, 
privilege, or agency (Neak 2003, 19).  
        Neither  does  liberalism  help  explain the dynamics of the EMP’s and Dialogue’s 
multilateralism in promoting security in the Med, since the prima facie assumption of this theory, 
as one of underlying harmony in the international relations of this region, could not be further 
from the truth. While liberalism conceptualizes the “interaction of multiple actors pursuing 
multiple interests and using different types of resources and methods of interaction” (Ibid.) to 
achieve them, including underlying norms in the “service of a greater, collective good” (Ibid.), in 
my opinion this theory is also insufficient to explain the process of multilateralism in the Med in 
addressing the security challenges there. 
         Rather, I would argue that in order to transcend millennia of clashes, we should explore the 
possibility of changing the assumptions about peace in the Mediterranean definition of security to 
identify post-structural, sub- and supra-state agents (such as terrorist groups, NGOs and of course 
the post-Westphalian EU) post-Cold War. Although the tradition referent object in matters of war 
and peace has been the state, its centrality is questioned as criteria like the mutual co-constitution 
of interests, identities, agency and structure of the individual or society have been identified as 
decisive in the security community discourse (Bicchi 2001, 2). In the post-Cold War 
environment, despite the continuing nuclear and terrorist threat, mutually assured destruction is 
not necessarily assumed by state actors and hence deterrence is not necessarily the primary 
motivation in foreign policy any longer. Rather, the possibility of escaping from this limited 
military perspective is explored by both IGOs, acknowledging other securitizing factors, e.g. 
environment or citizens’ welfare and governments. The complementarity of these two multilateral 
IGOs, the Dialogue and the EMP, reduces transaction costs by avoiding duplication of the 
security and defense mechanisms. This advantage in the efficiency of harmonizing among 
members reduces the power balancing maneuvers of the Cold War, which consumed so many 
resources that could be much better spent on the development of human capital in the south and 
eastern regions of the Mediterranean. Instead, the multi-lateral mechanisms of the Dialogue and 
the EMP enable the Mediterranean security community to move beyond the retaliatory rhetoric of 
the Cold War to contribute to regional stability (through much more graduated responses 
available) for the socio-economic development of this region and reduce e.g. the dividing lines 
between north and south which i.e. the demographic developments
8 bring. 
        Discourse has an ideational dimension with cognitive and normative functions, as well as 
“an interactive dimension, with coordinative and communicative functions (Schmidt 2000, cited 
in Howorth 2004, 212). While the impact of ideas had been assumed to be the weakest factor in 
security and defense policy (Howorth Ibid.), policy elites in Europe restructured a radically 
transition from the Cold War to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as a new 
“coordinative discourse” (Ibid). This slowly evolving common acceptance of an integrated 
European interventionism is based beyond national interests (‘British Atlanticism’, ‘French 
                                                           
     
8 i.e. countries in the south and east of the Mediterranean find it difficult to provide (gender equal) basic education 
amidst the  great population growth in their region  - and hereby adequately address the social and security challenge 
this represents to the northern Mediterranean countries. 
 10exceptionalism’ and ‘German pacifism’) but “on far more idealistic motivations such as 
humanitarianism and ethics” (Ibid.). The new willingness by Europeans  
     to discuss their collective interests and preferences within the Alliances … [as well 
as move] towards a greater Euro-American balance in influence and responsibilities … 
[reflected] a growing European inter-subjectivity based on cultural norms and values 
(Howorth 2004, 214) 
and was reflected in the Common Foreign and Security Policy emerging from the 2001 Treaty of 
Nice. 
      Bicchi (2001) also favors a constructivist approaches to the European security concept: rather 
than the existence of a “natural” threat, we need to examine instead how security and the security 
threat were constructed through discourse and practice (Adler and Barnett 1998), such as the 
importance of language and the definition of security. For example, does “threat” emphasize the 
existence of a “real” threat which underlines aggregate power, proximity, capability (these three 
factors being objective), and offensive intentions (relating to mutual understandings and 
communications, whereby a threat does not exist unless it was perceived as a threat) (Wolfers 
1962), as was the position of classical realists, such as Walt (1985, 8-13), as well as “challenge” 
(Campbell 1992), representing three points on a continuum going from supporting the view of a 
real-reality to those who believe in pure language (and de-constructing power games). 
        While  this  idealistic  discourse  was  perfectly “real” post-Cold War but pre-9/11, we 
recognize that changes in security perceptions post-9/11 result in changes in foreign policy, 
tending towards a more robust explanation for foreign policy changes. Comparisons of perception 
within a single geographical region can reveal differences in perception by actors, especially with 
respect to foreseeable “post-Iraq” scenarios (Bicchi 2001, 17). In light of this, the “soft” power 
ideas and programs of the EMO to co-constitute structures for peace will have to be balanced 
with NATO’s Article 5 mission: “Security is indivisible within the Euro-Atlantic region” 
9, as a 
pact against war (Yost 1998, 6) vs. the now favored  non-Article 5 missions of collective security 
of an alliance to “deter, and if necessary defend, against one or more identifiable external 
threats”. This goes back to the Wilsonian conviction that collective security is an international 
morality superior to that on which the realist balance of power system is based (Yost 1998, 8) – 
and it has always been understood that NATO would not undertake a mission without UN 
Security Council approval (especially after the U.S. overcame this restraint on national action 
with the invasion of Iraq with limited success at the time of this writing, partially due to this 
unilateralism). 
 
B.   Cooperation in peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean (Dialogue) armed forces 
 
The post-9/11 security environment has changed i.a. with respect to the Mediterranean, and in 
particular to the Dialogue in terms of geography, modi operandi of change and changed value 
systems.  
 
1. Geography 
 
Following 9/11 and the Afghan and Iraq military “campaigns, the potential geographic space for 
security cooperation between NATO and Dialogue countries has expanded eastward all the way 
to Afghanistan and possibly beyond” (Said 2004). This might affect the alliances’ “per se”
10 
logistics of in terms of planning, training, command and control, strategic transport, and 
intelligence operations (Ibid.) in this security system. 
                                                           
      
9  Comparable to the theme of the League of Nations that “peace is indivisible” 
     
10 e.g. Egypt, Jordan and Morocco already having worked under NATO command in the Balkans and might be 
suitable for involvement in Alliance operations elsewhere to combat terrorism and WMD-proliferation (Assessing 
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue) 
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2. Modi operandi for change 
 
As geography refers to space, the modi operandi for change relate to time frames and levels of 
urgency, efficiency, cost and evaluation of consequences (Ibid.). While the “Clintonian” approach 
to MENA emphasized dialogue, treaties, confidence building and economic incentives, the last 
four years saw more intrusive, pre-emptive and interventionist policies by trans-Atlantic allies 
(Ibid.). This more interventionist approach is questioned on ethical, legal and political grounds 
and leads to inquiries about regional
11 and international responsibility for stabilization and 
reconstruction (Said 2004). Thiele et al. (2005) suggest the following future security strategies for 
the Mediterranean, recognizing the differing priorities of national interests between N. European 
and S. Europeans in this, but addressing it EU-jointly: 
 
         a. Formation of a partnership between NATO and the EU for joint initiatives in the Med 
among those partners, e.g. Algeria, who prefer to avoid a tete-a-tete with the U.S.,  but are able to 
engage via NATO with them multilaterally (Thiele et al.). The other option would be endless bi-
lateral arrangements, which, though not invalid per se, do not contribute to the same stability as 
multilateral arrangements do, because bilateral arrangements are i.a. open to much more 
exacerbated power balancing maneuvers, especially with respect to the position of Turkey and 
Israel
12 (and a lesser extent e.g. Greece/Cyprus). 
 
         b. This partnership would capitalize on the strength of both organizations and avoid their 
weaknesses in light of the common goal to make it a win-win for all partners:  
       Benefits for the EU would be reducing frictions within the EU concerning its relationship 
with NATO, becoming a more capable in preventive actions and crisis management, and the EU 
would become a more engaged transatlantic partner, balancing U.S.-unilaterality in the Med and 
encourage more multi-laterality. This would counteract the suspicion by the Arab dialogue 
countries that the ESDP represent a post-colonial instrument of influence – or worse, of 
intervention – by the EU in MENA. 
       Benefits  for  NATO  coordination  with the ESDP (and the EMP) would expand NATO’s 
policy dimensions and scope in areas where U.S. involvement was previously low (e.g. North 
Africa except Morocco). 
              Benefits for MENA would be an increased transparency in EU and NATO programs 
concerning their region, and a complementarity in programs rather than duplication or non-
complementarity between EU and NATO initiatives, as well as country-specific cooperation in 
good governance programs in economic, political, social and military programs to overcome 
mistrust, unresolved disputes, and possibly  Islamic fundamentalist opposition movements. 
 
           c. Conflict prevention and crisis management in sub-regional security regimes can also be 
enhanced by a comprehensive approach through arms control of conventional as well as WMDs, 
especially in light of EU enlargement, potentially along the Adriatic and its connection to the 
Mediterranean. 
 
           d. Encouragement and support of good governance, human rights and democracy programs 
along the European Security Strategy of Dec. 2003 to stabilize the region, promoting a ring of 
                                                           
     
11 The Afghan and Iraq campaigns appear to have accelerated plans for reforming the “Arab League, social, 
democratic and human rights reforms in Egypt and Libya’s unilateral decision to give up its weapons of mass 
destruction (Ibid.). 
     
12 which some view as privileged 
 
 12well governed countries to the East of the EU and along the borders of the Med. Additionally, 
support for the importance of economic and structural changes (although an open door policy 
towards the Mediterranean is utopian at the moment). 
 
           e. Other policy options to induce developments within Med Dialogue Partner countries 
would be common benchmarks, conditionality through gradualism and cross-issue linkage, 
cooperation with NGOs in Med to strengthen the starting points for the development of civil 
society and development aid to safeguard certain standards to guarantee the constant progress of 
human rights and good governance. 
     The recent more interventionist U.S. approach to the Middle East emphasizes changes in the 
region’s value system to align it to more democratic Western models (Said 2004). This is set 
against the imbalance created by the vast U.S. military superiority currently in the region which 
might provoke further acts of terrorism and instability (Ibid.). The current and potentially future 
regional instability would require additional approaches for future cooperative strategies between 
NATO, Dialogue members countries and other actors in the region (Ibid.), as previous items on 
their agenda, such as combating terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, disaster relief and 
humanitarian response missions, de-mining and peacekeeping operations, as well as building 
regional infrastructure remain there (Ibid.). 
 
B.  NATO’s Dialogue vs. the EMP 
 
1. More or less Military in the EuroMed post-Iraq? 
 
Observers have pointed that NATO “supply” had been greater in the Euro-Med than demand for 
NATO from MENA (except for Jordan and Israel). Nebraska Senator Chuck Hegel (quoted in 
Rubin 2007) stated a few days ago that “the great challenge of the future will be the 
reintroduction of America to the world”. Former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinkski 
in his recent book faults all three post-Cold War American presidents for failing to capitalize on 
the U.S.’ unique standing as “global leader”, by either not pushing hard enough for a Middle East 
peace accord following the 1991 Gulf War, for assuming that economic globalization alone 
would solve human problems, rather than exacerbate some, or for pursuing a “self-declared 
existential struggle against the forces of evil” (quoted in Rubin 2007) – which ironically might 
instead undermine America’s moral stature in the world (Ibid.). While military power is 
important in the global balance, the next American president will need to demonstrate that the 
U.S. exercises it on a collective basis as a genuine partner for the world community and as proof 
of the U.S. capacity for global leadership (Ibid.).  
 
2. Soft Power - The role of civil society in security 
 
The concept of hegemony, based on control and force, may be relevant to the maintenance of 
security communities (in terms of a neo-Gramscian form of hegemony), or may be traced back to 
Thycydides, as hegemonia, founded on moral, cultural and intellectual leadership, and based on 
consent and rooted in legitimacy among the secondary states (Flockhart 2007). When Turkey’s 
bid for EU membership becomes successful, the EU will border at that point Iran, Iraq and Syria. 
With these countries as potential new EU neighbors, it is understandable that the EU is not only 
following developments in Iraq very closely, but showing a definite self-interest in the current 
developments there. From its position of strength in soft power, European Commissioner for 
External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is actively participating in the Iraqi Compact as “a 
new partnership with the international community aiming to help Iraq on the path of peace and 
political and economic reconstruction” (EU News release 5/3/2007). While the U.S. has 
obviously had endless meetings with Iraq and its neighbors since 2003 (if not before) on these 
 13topics, the “shock and awe”-effect of the Anglo military engagement appears at this point to have 
diminished the motivation of Iraq’s multiple actors (and those of their neighbors) to jointly 
participate in their country’s future structural continuities and processes (and appear to instead 
favor asymmetrical warfare against the occupation instead).  
        In  the  interest  of  this  potentially  ever “widening” European security “region” (now 
potentially including Syria, Iran and Iraq, as mentioned abov, as potentially new EU-neighbors) 
the EU through its Neighborhood Policy (of which the EMP is the specialized regional program) 
intends to assist Iraq by focusing mainly on the rehabilitation of basic services, support of the 
political process, including elections, support of job creation and of Iraqi capacity building and 
humanitarian assistance (Ibid.).  
        The irony will not be lost on the reader that these are actually also the very programs and 
intentions the U.S. had for Iraq – but proceeded to impose them “top down” on Iraq without, I 
claim, securing the absolutely essential “mutual constitution” between agent, structure, interests 
and identity in this process. Yes, it’s messy and time consuming at first glance. In the end, 
however, sometimes the tortoise may be successful – possibly because of a difference in the 
perception of “time” between the “old” continent and the “new” world in matters of progress (or 
perhaps, for no other reason, for the “old” continent not being able to afford to waste resources 
blindly). With other words, despite similar interests between the EU and the U.S. as actors, their 
different identities inform different processes, leading to different structural outcomes. 
 
IV.  Conclusions: the Mediterranean as a Security Complex  -  
       Overlap or Complementarity between NATO and the EMP? 
 
A security complex is defined in terms of power relations (i.e. the regional interactions between 
the states in this complex) and patterns of amity/enmity (those relationships which range from 
friendship to expectations of protection and support vs. those which are beset by suspicion and 
fear) (Haddadi 1999, 4). My present analysis leads me to concur with Buzan’s (1984, quoted in 
Haddidi 1999, 4) approach to the Mediterranean as a security community. With this approach 
Buzan uses security as an analytical tool, broader than power and peace, as well as a paradigm to 
build solutions to “reduce threats and vulnerabilities without leading to a ‘security dilemma’” 
(Ibid.), with a regional security complex as the framework of analysis. This would represent a 
“management approach”, wary of the limits of national, regional and international dynamics in 
insecurity questions, but instead reconciles “differences and concentrates on the harmonious 
interrelations between individuals and states alike” (Ibid.). This security complex approach would 
“capture the security dynamics and the interdependence operating in a region with relation to 
their impact, both internally and externally, on states and societies” (Haddadi 1999, 4). 
        The  Mediterranean’s  strategic  importance for earlier civilizations throughout millennia 
appears poised to be at the epicenter of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Anglo-American invasions of 
Iraq and NATO occupation of Afghanistan over terrorism and oil, against a backdrop of religious, 
socio-economic and political disparities between all parties (Papacosma 2004). Neoliberal 
institutionalist scholars have emphasized the role of international institutions in helping self-
interested states to achieve and sustain cooperation in an anarchic international setting. Yet the 
effectiveness of institutions in promoting cooperation remains contingent on member states’ 
commitment to undertaking and observing the institution’s norms, rules and regulations. (Gomez 
Mera 2007). 
        While the Dialogue had an intrinsic “evolutionary” potential (Cold War vs. post-Cold War), 
the tragic events of 9/11 did not fundamentally alter the goals of the Dialogue itself or change the 
conceptual framework in the 1999 Strategic Concept, but rather highlighted the need for NATO 
and its Mediterranean partners to cooperate closer and substantiate their friendship within the 
Dialogue frameworks laid earlier in the face of common terrorist and WMD challenges (Bin 
2003, 2), as well as to give it possibly “greater clarity of purpose” (Ibid). While the Dialogue has 
 14widened and deepened over the years, it remains behind the Euro-Atlantic Parntership Council 
(EAPC) and the PfP mostly as a confidence-building program, rather than as a true partnership 
(Bin 2003, 2). Some of the reasons suggested for this “lag” of the Dialogue in developing its true 
potential behind other NATO programs is uncertainty among Allies and the Mediterranean 
partners over the degree and extent of cooperation possible and necessary. 
       Between “terrorism as a fight that binds” and potential Iraqi instability, which might tear the 
region apart, the enlarged Dialogue should also be open to other new members. This should not 
necessarily be based on geographic considerations alone, since Jordan is technically not a 
Mediterranean country, but might leave future membership open to Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, more 
Gulf States and possibly Iran (Said 2004). Since (lack of) progress in the Middle East peace 
process is also undermining the efficacy of both EU (such as the EMP), and NATO initiatives 
(such as the Dialogue), increasing the multilaterality based  on the security and conflict-resolution 
capabilities of these institutions might be a legitimate alternative to the heavily unilateral actions 
in the region of the last four years. Not only would this bring the focus back to the significance of 
development as one factor in improving regional security (Sen 1999), but would additionally give 
a greater number of Dialogue and EMP member countries a stake in contributing to the “hard 
power” aspects of Mediterranean security. 
         With respect to the Dialogue, it has been suggested that possible programs for “deepening” 
it could include disaster management, science and environment including activities in the fields of 
desertification, drought, management of water and other natural resources and environmental 
pollution (Bin 2003, 3). Clearly the majority of these proposed programs are already also 
addressed by EMP programs. This does not mean that the Dialogue is unsuitable to also address 
them, but rather that there most likely exists potential for synergy between the Dialogue and the 
EMP, the former having the hard power (i.e. defense budgets and, literally, the equipment) at its 
disposal, the latter the soft power and possibly greater trust, especially after the ambivalence 
created in the region due to some of the unilateral actions undertaken in the region in the last four 
years. 
        Combating terrorism and freeing the Middle East from weapons of mass destruction were 
priorities for the Arab Dialogue countries already in the 1990s, though not yet for NATO 
(Assessing NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue). However, Kaplan (1999, 211) states that “the 
challenge of a radical Islamic movement on the southern rim of the Mediterranean may be the 
central mission of the alliance in the new millennium”. MENA’s half-hearted participation in the 
EMP and the Dialogue reflected their disappointment in the Middle East peace process and the 
differences in perspective they signaled against constructive thinking for the region’s future 
(Ibid.). Enhanced integration between the members of NATO and the EMP would be the ideal 
scenario in terms of neo-functionalism (a la Jean Monnet: “to make war unthinkable and 
materially impossible”), especially if augmented by a full free trade area between MENA and the 
EU in order to support stability economically through development
13.  
       One  of  the  greatest  security  threats  to Europe today, despite and because of events 
surrounding the Iraq invasion, would be a disrupted trans-Atlantic relationship due ideological 
fall-out. The Cold War and its nuclear stalemate as central to the European security community 
have changed now into an acute threat from the potential use of WMDs, especially in 
asymmetrical warfare globally. Security today needs to be approached differently to respond 
effectively to the needs and threats in the contemporary Mediterranean from the military to the 
environmental, politico-economic and the socio-cultural of the societal sphere. The theme of a 
NATO academic forum, “American and Europe: A time for Unity, a Time for Vision” holds 
today as much as it did ten years ago, only one might want to add “a time for peace” for this 
                                                           
    
13 MENA as the south/eastern Mediterranean neighborhood of the EU will always be this: the EU neighborhood and 
not a member state. 
 
 15region, where still today “the most likely candidate for future European security crises may be 
located” (El-Gawhary 1999, 17), and where military options alone have not brought the peace 
desired by the West. This shows that in terms of realism, if one wants peace, one needs to be 
prepared to fight, has not held true in the Mediterranean. Rather, the “ethnic and religious 
rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights and 
the dissolution of states” (Ibid., 18) continue to destabilize MENA – and their crises affect Euro-
Atlantic stability. To alter these paradigms, the socio-economic and political causes of instability 
need to be addressed, and a re-invigorated and re-dedicated EMP would be in an excellent 
position to address these challenges for future Mediterranean regional stability.  
        At a time when the U.S. has withdrawn from “a vast array of multilateral negotiations on 
issues ranging from money laundering to combating AIDS” (Mohamedi and Sadowski 2001, 12), 
it has not only angered old allies, but not necessarily made the world safer for democracy either. 
The underlying logic of multilateralism is that countries have a voice in shaping policies and are 
bound to contribute to their execution and share its burdens in order to prevent new dividing lines 
from forming, specifically in this case, between the north and the south and east of the 
Mediterranean.  
       Much national blood and treasure has been lost by the U.S. being the world’s unilateral 
policeman. Countries will cooperate in a coalition instead if it is in their interest to do so. Shifting 
to the multilateralism inherent in offshore balancing also shifts the burdens in achieving peace by 
a return to international institutions to promote international cooperation, extract needed funds, 
troops and legislation from other states for this purpose, whether for direct military preparedness, 
such as through NATO (in complementarity now with the European defense force) , the norming 
“effect” of the UN (such as through sanctions), or by addressing underlying structural challenges 
in MENA which had made peace unstable so far, such as through programs by the EMP.   
Brzezinski (2007) suggests approaching American foreign policy “post-Iraq” with complete 
information in all languages (both literally, and, one might surmise, as a constructivist approach 
as well), including all “tools” (beyond intelligent analysis also integrity), the long-term foreign 
policy goals per se (i.e. multinational, multi-agency, including sub-regional), which might favor 
some Mediterranean EU members with greater familiarity in the region as compared to the 
northern EU members, (per Calleya 2004), accountability to domestic as well as global citizens, 
“morality” (e.g. the “Golden Rule”) – and soft power (“love not war” a la Ghandi), i.e. the role 
low politics and high politics in regional peace. Neak (2003, 66)  positions this as where “New 
Foreign Policy” diverges from the past with respect to moral (“conforming the standards of what 
is right or just in behavior; virtuous” (American Heritage Dictionary))  positions and values.  
         Although grand theories as worldviews are premised on moral judgments, some realists 
such as Morgenthau warned against interweaving moral judgments and other worldviews in 
politics at all. In terms of future western engagement in the Mediterranenan, it does not appear 
unlikely that the Iraq war, which just had its four year anniversary, and its direct costs to the U.S., 
as well as those in terms of increased regional instability (as a result of blowback) may also shape 
the moral positions on a personal cognitive level of future leaders in the U.S., the EU and other 
Dialogue and EMP members in their foreign policy.  
        On  a  state  level  of  analysis,  the  Iraq experience has shown that there is no one-size 
democracy: both the Dialogue and the EMP are promoting security and stability among their 
members as well as “out-of-area”, the former through training and technical exercises, the latter 
through programs supportive of human rights, economic development, ethnic strife, religious 
freedom, supportive of human development and the growth of civil society. One of the lessons 
learnt in recent history in the “greater Mediterranean” may be to guard against the perception of 
Grand strategy to address root causes of instability. Or is it ok to still have a global vision in the 
Middle East  – as long as it is in cooperation with states involved as more than political power but 
also socio-(cultural)-economic power? 
 16         After all, the evolution of post-Cold War institutions was intended to provide security and 
stability and avoid the re-emergence of new dividing lines. 
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